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Recent Developments

Brown v. Dermer
Lead Paint Plaintiffs Need Only Show Landlord Had Reason to Know of Chipping
Paint
By Todd R. Chason

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a plaintiff
in a lead paint action survives
summary judgment by merely alleging
that a landlord has knowledge of
flaking, chipping, or otherwise loose
paint. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md.
344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000). It is not
necessary to allege that the landlord
knew the paint was lead based; here,
mere evidence that the landlord had
knowledge of deteriorating paint
created an issue of material fact.
The Browns, and their twins
born in January of 1984, lived in a
home rented from the Dermers. One
month prior to becoming pregnant
with the twins, Ms. Brown allegedly
gave notice to the landlords that there
was chipping paint in the home. The
landlord denied receiving this
notification, and the condition went
uncorrected. In 1985, both children
were diagnosed with increased levels
oflead in their bloodstream. Upon
investigation of the residence, the
Baltimore City Health Department
found thirty violations related to lead
paint, which the landlords were given
one week to correct; however, they
failed to comply for almost three
months. The Browns subsequently
filed suit for negligence.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore
City granted the Dermer's motion for
summary judgment, which was
affirmed by the court of special

appeals. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari. The issue
before the court of appeals was what
must a plaintiff allege in a lead paint
case to survive summary judgment.
Specifically, whether evidence must be
offered that the landlord knew or had
reason to know a danger existed due
to lead-based, chipping paint, or
whether mere allegations of
knowledge of chipping paint were
sufficient.
The court of appeals noted that
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501(e),
the plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts
from which a jury could conclude that
the defendants acted negligently.
Brown, 357 Md. at 354, 744 A.2d
at 53. The couit stated that "summary
judgment is generally not appropriate
for issues concerning knowledge,
motive, or intent because the facts
concerning the defendant's
knowledge and conduct, and the
circumstances in which they existed.
.. are best left for resolution by the
trier of fact attrial." ld. at355, 744
A.2d at 53 (quoting Federal Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599
F.Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984)).
The court turned its analysis to
Maryland law regarding negligence,
noting that a plaintiffmust prove (1) a
duty upon the defendant to protect the
plaintifffrom injury, (2) breach ofthat
duty, (3) resulting injury, and (4)
proximate cause between the injury

and defendant's breach. Id. at 356,
744 A.2d at 54. The court
recognized that the requisite duty may
be established by statute; thus, the
violation of a statute may provide
evidence of a breach of duty. ld. at
358, 744A.2dat55. Finally, a prima
facie case of negligence is made by
showing a nexus between violation of
the statute and the resulting injury. ld.
at 359, 744 A.2d at 55.
The court of appeals examined
the Baltimore City Housing Code,
which provides that in order to
properly maintain property, "interior
walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and
windows shall be kept clean and free
from any flaking, loose or peeling
paint and paper." ld. .(quoting
Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl.
Vol.),Art.13 § 703(2)(c)). Thecourt
found a statutory obligation existed
to eradicate deteriorating paint
conditions about which the landlord
knows, regardless of lead content.
See id. at 359-60, 744 A.2d at 5556. Otherwise stated, a violation is
established merely by showing "that
there was flaking, loose or peeling
paint .... " ld. The court held that
this statutory violation constituted
evidence of negligence by the
landlord. ld. at 359, 744 A.2d at
55.
The court, however, was quick
to point out that the plaintiffmust still
establish that the landlord was
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provided notice of the violation. Id
at 361, 744 A.2d at 57. The court
stated this "reason to know" test was
the fIrst prong that the plaintiff must
satisfY to survive summary judgment.
Id at 362, 744 A.2d at 57. The court
noted that it must be shown that "the
defendant has knowledge sufficient to
support an inference of knowledge of
the condition is required." Id It is
unnecessary that the plaintiffshow that
the deteriorating paint contained lead.
Id The second prong of the test is
foreseeability. Id The plaintiffmust
show that a reasonable person would
realize that an injury due to lead paint
is possible. Id The Defendant's
actual knowledge is not an issue. Id
The court then compared this
standard with its prior jurisprudence
in the area oflead paint litigation. The
court analyzed its holding in Richwind
Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md.
661,645 A.2d 1147 (1994), where
evidence was presented that the
apartment in question, built prior to
1957, was in a state of ill repair,
including chipping and flaking paint.
Id. at 363, 744 A.2d at 57. In
Richwind, it was further established
that the landlord had been a property
owner in Baltimore for sixteen years
and knew that property constructed
before 1957 often contained lead
paint. Id
The Richwind court found that
sufficient evidence existed to defeat
the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id at 364, 744 A.2d at
58. The court in the instant case,
however, suggested that the showing
in Richwind actually exceeded the
proof necessary to survive summary
judgment. Id. at 365, 744 A.2d at
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59. The court noted that the jury could
have "found that the defendant's
breach of statutory duty prescribed
by the housing code was proximately
related to the injury alleged, without
specifically finding that the defendant
had actual knowledge or reason to
know of the presence or hazards of
lead-based paint." Id
The court then analyzed the
cases that the landlords offered to
support their contention that summary
judgment was appropriate. The
decisions in both Winston Properties
v. Sanders, 565 N.E.2d 1280, (Ohio
App. 1989) and Garcia v. Jiminez,
539 N.E.2d 1356, (Ill. App. 1989)
held that mere notice of deteriorating
paint "was insuffIcient to establish
liability." Id However, the court
distinguished both cases from the case
at bar. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland noted that in Winston, no
statute existed prohibiting peeling
paint without reference to lead
content, and in Garcia, there was no
applicable statute at all, and the court
relied entirely on common law
principles. Id at 370, 744 A.2d at
61. Thus, neither case instructed
against holding the landlords liable.
In the instant case, the court of
appeals found that the reason to know
element was satisfied because the
plaintifftestified she gave notice to the
Dermers regarding the eroding paint.
Id at 367, 744 A.2d at 60. Thus,
accepting plaintiffs testimony to be
true, the first-prong was met. Id
Additionally, the foreseeability
element was likewise met. Id The
court noted that the Housing Code
serves to put landlords on notice that
lead paint poses a significant danger

to children. Id The court stated that
even assuming arguendo, that the code
was insufficient, during depositions,
defendants acknowledged awareness
of lead paint laws and regulations
prohibiting loose paint. Id at 368,
744 at 60. The court therefore found
that it is clear that the lead paint injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs were
foreseeable, and the second-prong is
thus satisfied. Id
The court of appeals's holding
in Brown represents a significant
change in Maryland law regarding
summary judgment in lead paint cases.
Although the court suggested that
"Richwind does not establish a factual
threshold for all lead poisoning cases,"
that is precisely how it was viewed
by the legal community, including the
Court of Special Appeals ofMaryland
in this case. Id at 365, 744 A.2d at
59. There was no suggestion in
Richwind or any subsequent case that
Richwind"satisfied a higher burden"
than was required. Id Thus, this ruling
greatly lowers the bar that the plaintiff
must clear to defeat a defendant's
motion for swnmary judgment. The
court's holding practically guarantees
that summary judgment will almost
never succeed, and plaintiffs will
almost always be granted the
opportunity to present their case to a
Jury.
This ruling represents a
reasonable bright-line test- if notice
is given of defective paint, it must be
corrected. The burden is placed on
the landlord to investigate claims of
deteriorating paint made by tenants.
As a result of this ruling, to minimize
liability landlords will likely be more
responsive to tenants' complaints
o
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regarding paint. Ifthey fail to respond
to allegations ofdeteriorating paint, it
is at their own peril.
In sum, requiring knowledge
merely of defects in paint rather than
knowledge of the presence of lead
paint is a common sense approach
dictated by the language ofthe statute.
Moreover, it strikes an appropriate
balance between the needs of tenants
and landlords.
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